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Three years into the full scale invasion of Ukraine, we ask what life is like in areas under Russian control. We look at “ripe for russification” Crimea, which was annexed 11 years ago, Moscow’s subsequent efforts to assert itself in the separatist East, and the Kremlin’s challenges in subjugating parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2020642

Archived

Whilst the threat to Europe’s economic autonomy from a reliance on Chinese technologies has been evident for some time, many are now fearing that this dependence has created significant vulnerability in terms of national security [...]

Security services are fearful that sensors embedded within the hardware [of green energy technology] could collect data, control assets or even be used to monitor shipping and submarine activity if attached to wind turbines, for instance. As Chinese businesses dominate renewable supply chains in the green energy sector, there are limited options to source equipment from Western suppliers [...]

There are also wider concerns about the ownership of European terminals by Chinese companies, such as in Hamburg and Piraeus in Greece. One research paper commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies suggested that not only should Chinese investment in critical infrastructures be reviewed (and potentially blocked) at a European level, but that ports using Chinese software should be identified as well as the data being transmitted. It was also suggested that all EU members should put in place laws, ‘…to retake control of ports/terminals and other maritime infrastructures ownership and/or considered contingency plans in case that is required in a scenario of conflict (kinetic or otherwise) with China, in co-ordination with EU and other Member States.’

[...]

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2020642

Archived

Whilst the threat to Europe’s economic autonomy from a reliance on Chinese technologies has been evident for some time, many are now fearing that this dependence has created significant vulnerability in terms of national security [...]

Security services are fearful that sensors embedded within the hardware [of green energy technology] could collect data, control assets or even be used to monitor shipping and submarine activity if attached to wind turbines, for instance. As Chinese businesses dominate renewable supply chains in the green energy sector, there are limited options to source equipment from Western suppliers [...]

There are also wider concerns about the ownership of European terminals by Chinese companies, such as in Hamburg and Piraeus in Greece. One research paper commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies suggested that not only should Chinese investment in critical infrastructures be reviewed (and potentially blocked) at a European level, but that ports using Chinese software should be identified as well as the data being transmitted. It was also suggested that all EU members should put in place laws, ‘…to retake control of ports/terminals and other maritime infrastructures ownership and/or considered contingency plans in case that is required in a scenario of conflict (kinetic or otherwise) with China, in co-ordination with EU and other Member States.’

[...]

Archived

Whilst the threat to Europe’s economic autonomy from a reliance on Chinese technologies has been evident for some time, many are now fearing that this dependence has created significant vulnerability in terms of national security [...]

Security services are fearful that sensors embedded within the hardware [of green energy technology] could collect data, control assets or even be used to monitor shipping and submarine activity if attached to wind turbines, for instance. As Chinese businesses dominate renewable supply chains in the green energy sector, there are limited options to source equipment from Western suppliers [...]

There are also wider concerns about the ownership of European terminals by Chinese companies, such as in Hamburg and Piraeus in Greece. One research paper commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies suggested that not only should Chinese investment in critical infrastructures be reviewed (and potentially blocked) at a European level, but that ports using Chinese software should be identified as well as the data being transmitted. It was also suggested that all EU members should put in place laws, ‘…to retake control of ports/terminals and other maritime infrastructures ownership and/or considered contingency plans in case that is required in a scenario of conflict (kinetic or otherwise) with China, in co-ordination with EU and other Member States.’

[...]

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2020563

Archived

The Government is coming under renewed pressure over Chinese involvement in a major North Sea wind project.

The Green Volt North Sea farm, due to be Europe’s largest floating offshore wind farm, is a joint venture between a Japanese and an Italian-Norwegian company.

The Treasury has reportedly selected Chinese firm Mingyang Smart Energy to supply wind turbines.

The wind farm will be about 46 miles off the coast of Aberdeenshire and will generate up to 560MW of electricity. The firm says it is aiming for the plant to be operational in 2029.

There are concerns that the Chinese state could switch off the power once the wind farm is operational, or that the platforms could be used as spy sensors.

Liberal Democrat MP for Edinburgh West Christine Jardine said the Government needed to ensure the software could not be accessed remotely or be at risk of being switched off by others.

She said the Government must follow “rigorous processes”, adding: “That must include an assessment of any opportunities for remote access to the turbines, as the software will normally remain in control of the manufacturers, even once commissioned, which would leave them vulnerable to being switched off. We need local control."

Energy minister Kerry McCarthy said the department had processes in place to ensure any risk in the project was minimised.

Ms McCarthy said: “We have discussions with a wide range, variety, of international investors, but we do absolutely recognise this needs to be balanced against national security implications, and that is something that we work on constantly across Government.”

[...]

[UK] Chancellor Rachel Reeves flew to the country in January to meet the country’s leaders, and Foreign Secretary David Lammy will meet his Chinese counterpart this week.

This is despite concerns about China’s human rights record, and potential for them to use backdoors in Britain’s energy infrastructure to blackmail a future government.

[...]

Archived

The Government is coming under renewed pressure over Chinese involvement in a major North Sea wind project.

The Green Volt North Sea farm, due to be Europe’s largest floating offshore wind farm, is a joint venture between a Japanese and an Italian-Norwegian company.

The Treasury has reportedly selected Chinese firm Mingyang Smart Energy to supply wind turbines.

The wind farm will be about 46 miles off the coast of Aberdeenshire and will generate up to 560MW of electricity. The firm says it is aiming for the plant to be operational in 2029.

There are concerns that the Chinese state could switch off the power once the wind farm is operational, or that the platforms could be used as spy sensors.

Liberal Democrat MP for Edinburgh West Christine Jardine said the Government needed to ensure the software could not be accessed remotely or be at risk of being switched off by others.

She said the Government must follow “rigorous processes”, adding: “That must include an assessment of any opportunities for remote access to the turbines, as the software will normally remain in control of the manufacturers, even once commissioned, which would leave them vulnerable to being switched off. We need local control."

Energy minister Kerry McCarthy said the department had processes in place to ensure any risk in the project was minimised.

Ms McCarthy said: “We have discussions with a wide range, variety, of international investors, but we do absolutely recognise this needs to be balanced against national security implications, and that is something that we work on constantly across Government.”

[...]

[UK] Chancellor Rachel Reeves flew to the country in January to meet the country’s leaders, and Foreign Secretary David Lammy will meet his Chinese counterpart this week.

This is despite concerns about China’s human rights record, and potential for them to use backdoors in Britain’s energy infrastructure to blackmail a future government.

[...]

Archived version

• Housing was more than 1/3 of China’s GDP at its peak in 2015; today it is just 20%. This is having a major impact on local government finances, as land sales are their major source of revenue.

Caixin, China’s main business paper, summed up the crisis:

“Chinese local governments are desperately seeking new revenue streams by leveraging government-owned assets to address mounting debt pressures and dwindling coffers. A document from Bishan District in Chongqing, southwest China, went viral online, outlining the formation of a “Sell Everything to Save the Day” task force aimed at monetizing state-owned assets."

[...]

China’s property bubble was based on borrowed money, mainly financed through its ‘shadow banking’ system. Essentially, it was ‘subprime on steroids’:

• House price/earnings ratios reached an eye-popping 50x in Tier 1 cities like Shanghai.
• By comparison, in the US, New York prices were ‘only’ 14x when the US subprime bubble burst in 2008.

[...]

The reason is that the state owned all land in China till 1998. So people have never been through the normal peaks and troughs of a property cycle.

Instead, as they began buying property for the first time, they assumed the government would never let prices fall. But today, this wishful thinking has been exposed.

Now, the shadow banking system is disappearing. And as the chart shows, local government debt is rising rapidly. Essentially, China risks falling into a debt trap, where new loans have to be taken out to service old loans.

Even worse [...] total debt is now >350% of GDP. The issue, as Prof Michael Pettis of Peking University noted in the summer, is that China’s stimulus programme has financed vast amounts of “non-productive investment.“

AND ITS POPULATION IS NOT ONLY AGEING, BUT FALLING

[...]

It is highly unlikely that [China's current debt] could have been repaid even if the population was young and growing quickly. But China is at the other end of the spectrum, as the chart shows. Its population is now falling, and birth rates are half what they were before 1980.

The rise in China’s median age is therefore accelerating. This is now 40 years, double the level in 1980 before the One Child Policy was introduced.

[...]

China is now inevitably going to get old before it gets rich. Its export-oriented economy is facing the prospect of major trade barriers, as the US and Europe look to preserve jobs for their own populations.

And so China’s overcapacity problem is getting worse rather than better, even in areas where it has global market leadership:

• [China's] solar industry has 80% of global demand, but is operating at just 45% of capacity.
• Its auto industry is operating at <50% of capacity. NIO’s boss says it is entering “the most fierce and brutal phase of competition.

[...]

Archived version

• Housing was more than 1/3 of China’s GDP at its peak in 2015; today it is just 20%. This is having a major impact on local government finances, as land sales are their major source of revenue.

Caixin, China’s main business paper, summed up the crisis:

“Chinese local governments are desperately seeking new revenue streams by leveraging government-owned assets to address mounting debt pressures and dwindling coffers. A document from Bishan District in Chongqing, southwest China, went viral online, outlining the formation of a “Sell Everything to Save the Day” task force aimed at monetizing state-owned assets."

[...]

China’s property bubble was based on borrowed money, mainly financed through its ‘shadow banking’ system. Essentially, it was ‘subprime on steroids’:

• House price/earnings ratios reached an eye-popping 50x in Tier 1 cities like Shanghai.
• By comparison, in the US, New York prices were ‘only’ 14x when the US subprime bubble burst in 2008.

[...]

The reason is that the state owned all land in China till 1998. So people have never been through the normal peaks and troughs of a property cycle.

Instead, as they began buying property for the first time, they assumed the government would never let prices fall. But today, this wishful thinking has been exposed.

Now, the shadow banking system is disappearing. And as the chart shows, local government debt is rising rapidly. Essentially, China risks falling into a debt trap, where new loans have to be taken out to service old loans.

Even worse [...] total debt is now >350% of GDP. The issue, as Prof Michael Pettis of Peking University noted in the summer, is that China’s stimulus programme has financed vast amounts of “non-productive investment.“

AND ITS POPULATION IS NOT ONLY AGEING, BUT FALLING

[...]

It is highly unlikely that [China's current debt] could have been repaid even if the population was young and growing quickly. But China is at the other end of the spectrum, as the chart shows. Its population is now falling, and birth rates are half what they were before 1980.

The rise in China’s median age is therefore accelerating. This is now 40 years, double the level in 1980 before the One Child Policy was introduced.

[...]

China is now inevitably going to get old before it gets rich. Its export-oriented economy is facing the prospect of major trade barriers, as the US and Europe look to preserve jobs for their own populations.

And so China’s overcapacity problem is getting worse rather than better, even in areas where it has global market leadership:

• [China's] solar industry has 80% of global demand, but is operating at just 45% of capacity.
• Its auto industry is operating at <50% of capacity. NIO’s boss says it is entering “the most fierce and brutal phase of competition.

[...]

Archived version

• Housing was more than 1/3 of China’s GDP at its peak in 2015; today it is just 20%. This is having a major impact on local government finances, as land sales are their major source of revenue.

Caixin, China’s main business paper, summed up the crisis:

“Chinese local governments are desperately seeking new revenue streams by leveraging government-owned assets to address mounting debt pressures and dwindling coffers. A document from Bishan District in Chongqing, southwest China, went viral online, outlining the formation of a “Sell Everything to Save the Day” task force aimed at monetizing state-owned assets."

[...]

China’s property bubble was based on borrowed money, mainly financed through its ‘shadow banking’ system. Essentially, it was ‘subprime on steroids’:

• House price/earnings ratios reached an eye-popping 50x in Tier 1 cities like Shanghai.
• By comparison, in the US, New York prices were ‘only’ 14x when the US subprime bubble burst in 2008.

[...]

The reason is that the state owned all land in China till 1998. So people have never been through the normal peaks and troughs of a property cycle.

Instead, as they began buying property for the first time, they assumed the government would never let prices fall. But today, this wishful thinking has been exposed.

Now, the shadow banking system is disappearing. And as the chart shows, local government debt is rising rapidly. Essentially, China risks falling into a debt trap, where new loans have to be taken out to service old loans.

Even worse [...] total debt is now >350% of GDP. The issue, as Prof Michael Pettis of Peking University noted in the summer, is that China’s stimulus programme has financed vast amounts of “non-productive investment.“

AND ITS POPULATION IS NOT ONLY AGEING, BUT FALLING

[...]

It is highly unlikely that [China's current debt] could have been repaid even if the population was young and growing quickly. But China is at the other end of the spectrum, as the chart shows. Its population is now falling, and birth rates are half what they were before 1980.

The rise in China’s median age is therefore accelerating. This is now 40 years, double the level in 1980 before the One Child Policy was introduced.

[...]

China is now inevitably going to get old before it gets rich. Its export-oriented economy is facing the prospect of major trade barriers, as the US and Europe look to preserve jobs for their own populations.

And so China’s overcapacity problem is getting worse rather than better, even in areas where it has global market leadership:

• [China's] solar industry has 80% of global demand, but is operating at just 45% of capacity.
• Its auto industry is operating at <50% of capacity. NIO’s boss says it is entering “the most fierce and brutal phase of competition.

[...]

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2019930

A new framework aimed at increasing the competitiveness of European industry is targeting lower energy costs and stronger purchase incentives for local and sustainable products, according to a leaked early draft of the measures.

[...]

EUROPE FOCUS “European preference criteria” are set to become a prominent factor in public and private procurement, according to the draft text, as well as new labelling for industrial products to more clearly delineate greener products from fossil-based ones.

The new measures could set out “minimum local content” requirements along with more robust sustainability criteria for public procurement, as well as exploring options for embedding similar “non-cost criteria” into product legislation.

CIRCULARITY, HYDROGEN The Commission could be set to limit the export of waste raw materials deemed critical for circular production, and is expected to ease restrictions on movement of raw materials across the region in the Circular Economy Act, expected next year.

Policymakers are also looking to clarify rules on low-carbon hydrogen production, and are set to launch a third call for projects through the Hydrogen Bank, the auction house set up to incentivise projects and investment, in the third quarter 2025.

CBAM REFORMS, DECARBONISATION TARGETS With a targeted package for the chemicals sector, which the draft text refers to as the “industry of industries”, expected towards the end of the year, the Commissions’ review of the proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) continues.

Intended to levy fees on the CO2 emissions of energy-intensive goods imports such as steel and fertilizers, the Commission is proposing to simplify the framework ahead of its roll-out next year, and reduce the administrative burden on businesses.

[...]

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2019930

A new framework aimed at increasing the competitiveness of European industry is targeting lower energy costs and stronger purchase incentives for local and sustainable products, according to a leaked early draft of the measures.

[...]

EUROPE FOCUS “European preference criteria” are set to become a prominent factor in public and private procurement, according to the draft text, as well as new labelling for industrial products to more clearly delineate greener products from fossil-based ones.

The new measures could set out “minimum local content” requirements along with more robust sustainability criteria for public procurement, as well as exploring options for embedding similar “non-cost criteria” into product legislation.

CIRCULARITY, HYDROGEN The Commission could be set to limit the export of waste raw materials deemed critical for circular production, and is expected to ease restrictions on movement of raw materials across the region in the Circular Economy Act, expected next year.

Policymakers are also looking to clarify rules on low-carbon hydrogen production, and are set to launch a third call for projects through the Hydrogen Bank, the auction house set up to incentivise projects and investment, in the third quarter 2025.

CBAM REFORMS, DECARBONISATION TARGETS With a targeted package for the chemicals sector, which the draft text refers to as the “industry of industries”, expected towards the end of the year, the Commissions’ review of the proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) continues.

Intended to levy fees on the CO2 emissions of energy-intensive goods imports such as steel and fertilizers, the Commission is proposing to simplify the framework ahead of its roll-out next year, and reduce the administrative burden on businesses.

[...]

Cross posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2019930

A new framework aimed at increasing the competitiveness of European industry is targeting lower energy costs and stronger purchase incentives for local and sustainable products, according to a leaked early draft of the measures.

[...]

EUROPE FOCUS “European preference criteria” are set to become a prominent factor in public and private procurement, according to the draft text, as well as new labelling for industrial products to more clearly delineate greener products from fossil-based ones.

The new measures could set out “minimum local content” requirements along with more robust sustainability criteria for public procurement, as well as exploring options for embedding similar “non-cost criteria” into product legislation.

CIRCULARITY, HYDROGEN The Commission could be set to limit the export of waste raw materials deemed critical for circular production, and is expected to ease restrictions on movement of raw materials across the region in the Circular Economy Act, expected next year.

Policymakers are also looking to clarify rules on low-carbon hydrogen production, and are set to launch a third call for projects through the Hydrogen Bank, the auction house set up to incentivise projects and investment, in the third quarter 2025.

CBAM REFORMS, DECARBONISATION TARGETS With a targeted package for the chemicals sector, which the draft text refers to as the “industry of industries”, expected towards the end of the year, the Commissions’ review of the proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) continues.

Intended to levy fees on the CO2 emissions of energy-intensive goods imports such as steel and fertilizers, the Commission is proposing to simplify the framework ahead of its roll-out next year, and reduce the administrative burden on businesses.

[...]