IronJumbo

joined 1 year ago
[–] IronJumbo@lemmy.world 1 points 23 hours ago (1 children)

In that case, it seems to me that the only threat is the mindless copying of public keys to other servers, as described in the article. But who does so? Do admins not create separate private-public keys for each server?

Thank you for the explanation!

 

Everyone knows that the content of the notification is encrypted, BUT THIS IS NOT ENOUGH:

https://www.privacy-handbuch.de/handbuch_73.htm

Requests to the PM Team (for example, for the implementation of Unified Push) have been ignored for many years.

For some people, using a safe ProtonMail app with a dangerous FCM can be a disaster in some countries (journalists, signals, political opposition, etc.)

Please repair it!

 

https://blog.thc.org/infecting-ssh-public-keys-with-backdoors

I am not a security expert and I wonder:

  1. Does the described method infect the remote or local machine (from which I connect)?
  2. Can this method be prevented? For example, correctly configuring your etc/ssh/ssh_config

It seems that every VPS supplier can hack you? The description shows that AWS does "harmless", but what if my hosting is a bad actor?

 

Dear Proton Team, do these threats also apply to applications and Web PM?

[–] IronJumbo@lemmy.world 2 points 6 months ago

Thanks Evgeny for your explanation and time (I'm sure we all appreciate it). But you didn't say directly and specifically - does the app make these connections to Google servers?

[–] IronJumbo@lemmy.world 2 points 8 months ago

I hope @epoberezkin@lemmy.ml will dispel our doubts or a member of the Simplex.chat team :(

[–] IronJumbo@lemmy.world 1 points 8 months ago (1 children)

It's not about whether the application communicates with these addresses or not. It's about the fundamental question: why are these addresses even encoded in the code of a VERY privacy-sensitive application?

My friend, in every answer you push F-Droid as a cure for all evil. There is no perfect store, F-Droid also has its problems (I wrote about it above). I am not an enemy of F-Droid (I also use it sometimes), but I will repeat: F-Droid control is insufficient (it's security theater - it's not a full audit of the source code).

[–] IronJumbo@lemmy.world 3 points 9 months ago (8 children)

When installing from Github you only trust the developer and their signed certificate key.

When installing from F-Droid you additionally also have to trust the F-Droid developer's signature.

Besides that F-droid has its own problems:

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/

I don't use F-Droid. I use Obtainium and additionally check signatures in AppVerifier.

https://sideofburritos.com/blog/obtainium-overview/

 

Hi

I may be wrong, but can someone help me interpret the results of this analysis correctly?

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/0a0238f85b8a559e8ab54f67920004db3a67a39bdbdbfa00075fd7d27e41dec4/672423b56b46e4feb006681d

See the Network Related section: Why does Simplex.apk have a hardcoded communication with

issuetracker.google.com

android.googlesource.com

developers.google.com

An app that is advertised as the most privacy-friendly?

All other indicators can (probably) be considered false positives (for example, the Camera permission, which is needed for video calls)

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submitted 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) by IronJumbo@lemmy.world to c/protonprivacy@lemmy.world
 

Please clarify if ProtonVPN servers are also affected and what are the corrective actions?

https://citizenlab.ca/2024/07/vulnerabilities-in-vpns-paper-presented-at-the-privacy-enhancing-technologies-symposium-2024/