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NYT

ISNA, an Iranian state news agency, is also reporting President Trump’s comments about the United States holding talks with Iran “next week.”

The latest Simplicius: Humiliation: Israel Tucks Tail After Failing All Objectives in War against Victorious Iran

I think the title's blatant triumphalism betrays how there's a battle in the media over the portrayal of the conflict, with both sides basically doing their own victory dances. I will say that the Israeli side does look a little depressed as the fragility of their society and economy and military has been laid bare, and there does appear to be a psychological blow to Zionists that may or may not translate into lasting change (e.g. mass evacuations). But like, you shouldn't have to constantly insist that you've won a conflict; the results should speak for themselves beyond all doubt. So I'm personally comfortable calling this a draw, but let's see what Simplicius has to say about it.

• Simplicius's previous argument that the strike on Fordow [using 14 bunker busters and not 6 like I thought? I'm not sure if I'm just losing my mind but I thought the US said 30 missiles and 6 bunker busters?] was an allowed strike seems strengthened by the fact that Iran responded with what was basically certain to be an allowed strike on Al Udeid.
• All parties involved got an off-ramp from a conflict that, even if it wasn't going particularly great for Iran, was going very badly for Israel - you don't want to get involved in an attrition war if you are a tiny state with infrastructure that can be easily disabled and you are opposing a country with ten times as many people and thousands of ballistic missiles.
• Iran had already taken out a significant number of Israeli heavy drones (combat-capable, rather than merely surveillance), such as Hermes drones. It's not clear how many Israel has, but we're talking a couple dozen of each type, not hundreds.
• These Israeli drones and missiles were the primary method of destruction on sensitive military targets. As more were shot down, Israeli jets would have needed to move further into Iran and risk being shot down.
• There is still little evidence that Israel was capable of flying over Iranian territory for any meaningful distance. The only evidence we have is that of Israeli jets over a coastal city. All Israeli combat footage over Iran was taken from drones. Now, we have seen Israeli fuel tanks wash up on the Caspian Sea coast, showing that Israel flew in from the north to bombard Tehran, rather than flying all the way through Iran to hit it. This isn't to be like "See! Israel has been fricking owned!!" because like, they can still bombard Tehran and do heavy damage - it's just important to clarify how that was done so that people don't learn the wrong lessons.
• Despite Trump's insistence, it's increasingly clear that if Iran's nuclear program has been set back at all (which it might not have) then it is only briefly. It is well-known that Iran's enriched uranium was shifted out of Fordow, and its location is not publically known. Some (in American media, even!) go further to say that Fordow was basically untouched and that the centrifuges are fine, according to leaks from White House intelligence.
• Simplicius says that the US only has - well, had - 20 GBU-57s, and if that's true, then their production rate must be truly glacial. With 14 dropped, there are now 6 remaining, which is insufficient for any kind of broad campaign against Iranian underground capabilities, especially if 14 of them were dropped on Fordow and it was fine, or at least not obliterated. [This point by Simplicius seems flatly incorrect, US production of these sorts of bombs is more along the lines of 6-8 per month, and they only have 20 of a very specific model.]
• Iran's airforce was basically a no-show during this conflict. It's not clear what happened with that; some are suggesting they were moved to the far east to be out of harm's way, and perhaps if the conflict intensified and became extended then they would step in. It's probably also not a bad idea to conserve as many planes as possible, especially as some of their pilots train on the Russian jets they received.
• The Israeli modus operandi against other regional actors was applied to Iran and met similar failure - they attempted a military victory and lost, and lost quite badly at that. Now, again, this isn't to say that Israel is therefore owned and mad, because where Israel seems to actually do quite well is in winning the peace - they are great at infiltrating and undermining nations that have been weakened by war even if technically victorious. We saw this happen in Lebanon and Syria, for instance.
• Simplicius says that it's not clear when the conflict will erupt again - maybe in hours, maybe in days, maybe even months or years. But Iran has created a degree of deterrence. Importantly, it has dealt a heavy blow to Israel's IMEC plan to create a new transport corridor to the Mediterranean that bypasses unfriendly states, with Haifa's port damaged and clearly much more vulnerable than the alternatives (such as the existing Suez Canal route, and China's BRI), which is important on a geopolitical level. China just can't stop winning, folks. They're getting tired of winning.

Imperialist Vanguard: Denmark Supports NATO Militarization, Backs American Aggression Against Iran

At today’s NATO summit in The Hague, Denmark emerged as one of the most fanatic supporters of the American demands for aggressive military expansion. The nordic hermit kingom's authoritarian leader Mette Frederiksen and Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the powerful and corruption-tainted head of the nation's Moderate Party-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs, voiced full-throated support as American vassal states aquiesced to Washington’s radical demands to channel 5% of their national GDP into military spending.

Current mood:

Nah but seriously a huge win! Congrats NYC!!!

Just saw a random ass tweet that made some interesting points about the Middle East and the ilusive Pivot to Asia

The ‘pivot to Asia’ never materializes because it doesn’t actually make any sense. It’s based on a loose analogy between what the US does in the Middle East and what the US could be doing in Asia that doesn’t hold.

The analogy is essentially:

Taiwan is Israel/China is Iran

America’s Asian allies are the Gulf states

Intellectual property is oil/Island disputes are religious conflict

So you can just move ‘US security provision + financial interests’ from one region to the other. Oil for IP.

This is why the US insists Asia has certain features that it clearly does not have - e.g., that sea lanes are under threat (has to be true to require US naval presence), that China cannot innovate and just steals IP (has to be true for IP to play the financial role of oil), etc.

There’s nothing at all to be gained by anyone in Asia from the US playing a bigger role. The Middle East had very specific needs because it’s full of oil producing states that can’t handle their own defense. It’s the nature of oil that makes the region a place of instability.

There’s no ‘larger role’ the US can play in Asia. There’s no way to trade increased security provision for a greater financial stake. The region is dominated by trade in manufactures, which is much more difficult to disrupt than the oil trade, and China is at the center of it.

IMF wild child Argentina seeks waiver on FX reserves misses - and will probably get it - Reuters