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Compromised Arch User Repository (AUR) Packages, installing RAT malware (lists.archlinux.org)

submitted 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) by Fubarberry@sopuli.xyz to c/archlinux@lemmy.ml

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On the 16th of July, at around 8pm UTC+2, a malicious AUR package was uploaded to the AUR. Two other malicious packages were uploaded by the same user a few hours later. These packages were installing a script coming from the same GitHub repository that was identified as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

The affected malicious packages are:

librewolf-fix-bin
firefox-patch-bin
zen-browser-patched-bin

The Arch Linux team addressed the issue as soon as they became aware of the situation. As of today, 18th of July, at around 6pm UTC+2, the offending packages have been deleted from the AUR.

We strongly encourage users that may have installed one of these packages to remove them from their system and to take the necessary measures in order to ensure they were not compromised.

According to the gamingonlinux discord, the following packages are also suspected to be compromised:

https://aur.archlinux.org/pkgbase/minecraft-cracked/

https://aur.archlinux.org/pkgbase/ttf-ms-fonts-all/

https://aur.archlinux.org/pkgbase/vesktop-bin-patched/

https://aur.archlinux.org/pkgbase/ttf-all-ms-fonts/

If you have any of these packages installed, immediately delete it and check your system processes for a process called systemd-initd (this is the RAT).

Here is an analysis of the malicious payload: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9f0df8da6d66aaae024bdca26a228481049595279595e96d5ec615392430d67

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[–] patatahooligan@lemmy.world 3 points 2 days ago (1 children)

.install scripts which don’t have to be explicitly mentioned in the PKGBUILD if it shares the same name as the package.

Can you show a reproducible example of this? I couldn't get a .install included in a test package I made without explicitly adding it as install=<package>.install.

Most people claim they read the PKGBUILD (which I don’t believe tbh)

If you don't trust people to read PKGBUILD's I'm curious which form of software installation (outside of official repositories) you find safe.

[–] slackness@lemmy.ml 3 points 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (1 children)

Can you show a reproducible example of this? I couldn’t get a .install included in a test package I made without explicitly adding it as install=.install.

I might be misremembering that detail or it might've changed since the last time I wrote a fresh PKGBUILD. Sorry I don't have any examples because my project does not use an install script.

If you don’t trust people to read PKGBUILD’s I’m curious which form of software installation (outside of official repositories) you find safe.

My preference goes Arch repos -> official aur packages that I read the manifests of -> verified flatpaks that I read the manifests of -> Nix -> compile myself

[–] Tenderizer78@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 days ago

The way Nix handles things seems so cool. And if you want to prevent a program from doing things it's not supposed to then a protocol that makes sure it has it's own copy of everything it's allowed to use would be necessary (if development isn't gonna be super obtuse).