Thanks for your analysis. I suppose "impossible" is not a precise way of phrasing it. What makes it seem impossible to me is the trade-off between risk and reward, rather than the theoretical feasibility. Assuming they can arrive within range of the target unmolested by AA guns (if not completely undetected), there is still the question of if the GBU-57 is capable of penetrating deep enough. I am also curious how effective these "precision guidance" kits are on a 30,000 pound weapon when it is being deployed from the altitudes needed to remain out of range from AA fire (not too high, I suppose) and detection (higher, I imagine). I suppose it is possible, and I am sure they applied billions of dollars worth of research and development to the problem, but it is certainly a difficult engineering challenge. You drop the bomb out of a plane and it is on a ballistic trajectory, and you can only alter that trajectory so much, especially when it is that massive.
There is a lot of uncertainty and risks involved to achieve an objective which has no military value at all beyond propaganda. There is no nuclear weapon being disarmed here, just the protection of Israel's ego and "affirmation" of US WMD claims, while exposing the US directly to military retaliation as well as ensuring the retaliatory missile strikes against Israel continue. I feel like the US would be better served by keeping the capabilities of these weapons purely theoretical, rather than potentially demonstrating their limitations on a target which provides no tactical benefit. If the attack fails, not only do they get nothing out of it, but the "Iran model" of simply building sensitive infrastructure deep underground basically becomes more deeply established as a viable strategy.
, but to clearly illuminate the causes of oppression and the means by which they are overcome. When we canonize revolutionary figures, we are holding them up as an example to be followed.
If Iron Dome interceptors are limited (as far as I know, this is the munition they have the most of, compared to the higher altitude interceptors), forcing them to shoot down 15-30 submunitions for one missile launch still has some potential strategic use. I imagine it at least forces a calculation of whether they will use a handful of high altitude interceptors to intercept before separation vs. several dozen Iron Dome interceptors to target the submunitions. This assumes Israel can reliably detect whether an incoming missile is carrying a conventional warhead or one of these ERS warheads, which isn't clear. If the missiles delivering these warheads have similar flight profiles, Israel might be forced to treat any incoming missile like it is potentially carrying one of these ERS systems.